


Security challenges in Industry 4.0

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
Industrial world of connected CPS






- **Originally-disconnected systems now “opening” to the Internet**
- Critical infrastructure and safety-critical systems
- (sometimes) no humans in the middle
- → Influence environment and humans (≠ data security!)

ICS on the Internet





Modern factory



17.4 Sending PDL2 commands via e-mail

The user is allowed to send PDL2 commands to the C4G Controller Unit, via e-mail. To do that, the required command is to be inserted in the e-mail title with the prefix 'CL' and the same syntax of the strings specified in SYS_CALL built-in. Example: if the required

.fm

l Functionality

command is ConfigureControllerRestartCold, the user m the e-mail title: 'CL CCRC'.

The authentication is performed by inserting a text which *c4gmp* program (on a PC), in the message body. Such system identifier (\$BOARD_DATA[1].SYS_ID), the send the required command, the user login and password; i inserted into the message body, and it will work as an a time and the Controller time (as well as the corrs synchronized, because the message returned by *c4gr* interval of half an hour, more or less, since the generatic

17.3 Sending/receiving e-mails on C4G Controller

A PDL2 program called "email" is shown below ("[email](#)" program): it allows to send and receive e-mails on C4G Controller.

[DV4_CNTRL Built-In Procedure](#) is to be used to handle such functionalities.



See [DV4_CNTRL Built-In Procedure](#) in [Chap. BUILT-IN Routines List](#) section for further information about the e-mail functionality parameters.

17.3.1 "email" program

```
PROGRAM email NOHOLD, STACK = 10000
CONST ki_email_cnfg = 20
  ki_email_send = 21
  ki_email_num = 22
  ki_email_rcv = 23
  ki_email_del = 24
  ki_email_hdr = 25
  ki_email_pls = 26
```



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
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Factories (and robots) ARE connected



Brand	Overall	Auth. Disabled
eWON	2,800	1,160
Welotec	1	0
Moxa	12,300	2,300
Virtual Access	260	0
Belden	500	0
Westermo	4,000	1,200
NetModule	530	135
Eurotech	0	-
InHand	608	0
Digi	1,200	0
Robustel	2,900	0
Sierra Wireless	0	0





- 1) Production Plant Halting (“up to 20,000\$/min”)
 - 2) Production Outcome Alteration
 - 3) Physical Damage
 - 4) Unauthorized Access
- And, of course, there is the ransomware scheme, but that’s not too interesting in the era of “oh, I could ransom that, too!”
 - Find detailed scenarios on <http://robosec.org>



- Information disclosure (way too verbose banners, detailed technical material)
- Outdated everything (kernel, compilers, libraries, ...)
- Weak \ known \ static credentials
- Poor or misconfigured transport encryption (e.g., VPN with static auth keys, pre-generated certs, ...)
- Insecure web interface (no input sanitization... and even security critical code copied straight from blog posts!)
- **No better than consumer IoT devices!**
- Read the full research report at <http://robosec.org>

How Stuxnet Spreads

Experts who have disassembled the code of the Stuxnet worm say it was designed to target a specific configuration of computers and industrial controllers, likely those of the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran.

INITIAL INFECTION

Stuxnet can enter an organization through an infected removable drive. When plugged into a computer that runs Windows, Stuxnet infects the computer and hides itself.

UPDATE AND SPREAD


If the computer is on the Internet, Stuxnet may try to download a new version of itself. Stuxnet then spreads by infecting other computers, as well as any removable drives plugged into them.

FINAL TARGET

Stuxnet seeks out computers running Step 7, software used to program Siemens controllers. The controllers regulate motors used in centrifuges and other machinery. While the computers in a secure facility may not be on a network, they can be infected with a removable drive. After infecting a controller, Stuxnet hides itself. After several days, it begins speeding and slowing the motors to try to damage or destroy the machinery. It also sends out false signals to make the system think everything is running smoothly.

Source: Symantec

THE NEW YORK TIMES





Businesses on the front line

- Shamoon targeted critical files from a specific company (Saudi Aramco)
- Targeted attack using signed driver component
- Overwrote critical files on 30.000 machines (¾) on the corporate network with a burning American flag
- Claimed by unknown “Cutting Sword of Justice” group on Pastebin

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Alert

Hack on Saudi Aramco hit 30,000 workstations, oil firm admits
First hacktivist-style assault to use malware?

By [John Leyden](#) · [Get more from this author](#)

Posted in [Security](#), 29th August 2012 09:18 GMT

Analysis Saudi Aramco said that it had put its network back online on Saturday, 10 days after a malware attack flooded 30,000 workstations at the oil giant.

In a [statement](#), Saudi Arabia's national oil firm said that it had "restored all its main internal network services" hit by a malware outbreak that struck on 15 August. The firm said its core business of oil production and exploration was *not* affected by the attack, which resulted in a decision to suspend Saudi Aramco's website for a period of a few days, presumably as a precaution. Corporate remote access services were also suspended as a result of the attack.

Oil and production systems were run off "isolated network systems unaffected by the attack, which the firm has pledged to investigate. In the meantime, Saudi Aramco [promised](#) to improve the security of its network to guard against fresh assaults.

Saudi Aramco has restored all its main internal network services that were impacted on August 15, 2012, by a malicious virus that originated from external sources and affected about 30,000 workstations. The workstations have since been cleaned and restored to service. As a precaution, remote Internet access to online resources was restricted. Saudi Aramco employees returned to work August 25, 2012, following the Eid holidays, resuming normal business.

The company confirmed that its primary enterprise systems of hydrocarbon exploration and production were unaffected as they operate on isolated network systems. Production plants were also fully operational as these control systems are



Attacks against ICS share some characteristics


- 2014: Steel mill incident
 - **Spear phishing** leads to compromise of corporate network
 - **Pivot** into plant network
 - Exploitation phase (compromise network controllers)
- 23rd December 2015: Ukraine power outage
 - Black energy malware
 - **Spear phishing** leads to compromise of corporate network
 - BlackEnergy malware steals VPN credentials
 - **Pivot** into plant networks
 - Exploitation phase (modification of UPS controller firmware)



The rise of targeted attacks against SME


Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Annual Total

- ▶ The highest number of zero-day vulnerabilities was disclosed in 2015, evidence of the maturing market for research in this area.




Spear-Phishing Email Campaigns

- ▶ In 2015, the number of campaigns increased, while the number of attacks and the number of recipients within each campaign continued to fall. With the length of time shortening, it's clear that these types of attacks are becoming stealthier.



Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization

- ▶ Attacks against small businesses continued to grow in 2015, although many of these attacks were directed to fewer organizations, increasing by 9 percentage points.



Source: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2016

Articolo »

Cronaca 10 maggio 2019 Casale Monferrato

Nella notte tra martedì e mercoledì

Attacco informatico alla EPTA (IARP)

L'azienda: "Dopo gli opportuni test le normali attività riprenderanno gradualmente a partire da lunedì mattina."



di Massimiliano Francia

Aggiornamento sabato 11 maggio ore 19,30 - Sono stati ripristinati nel corso del pomeriggio di oggi, venerdì alcuni servizi aziendali, tra cui l'accesso al sito aziendale che nel primo pomeriggio risultava oscurato ed è tornato accessibile. Dall'ufficio stampa dell'azienda, verso le 18,30, hanno fatto sapere che alcune attività sono state riprese e che comunque non tutto il gruppo - è stato bloccato dall'attacco hacker. Il ritorno alla normalità, insomma sembra essere iniziato e l'auspicio è che la produzione possa riprendere a pieno ritmo al più presto.



Renault sta riprendendo la produzione dopo un attacco informatico globale

Renault annuncia, dopo la sospensione della produzione da 5 suoi stabilimenti per gli attacchi informatici di venerdì, che tutto sta tornando alla normalità

di [Andrea Senatore](#), pubblicato il 15 Maggio 2017 alle ore 19:47



Il gruppo transalpino **Renault** e la partner nipponica **Nissan** hanno dichiarato questo lunedì che le cose stanno tornando alla normalità in quasi tutti i propri impianti, dopo un attacco informatico globale che ha causato danni estesi e la sospensione della produzione in diversi stabilimenti. Renault e il suo partner giapponese sono le uniche case automobilistiche più importanti che finora hanno segnalato problemi di produzione derivanti da **WannaCry ransomware**, l'attacco sul web senza fine che da venerdì si è diffuso in più di **150 paesi**.

GUIDA: **Renault**


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Sometimes, even untargeted attacks...

Cyberattacco contro Norsk Hydro, alluminio ai massimi da 3 mesi


—di Sissi Bellomo | 20 marzo 2019



Nuovo scossone sul mercato dell'alluminio, questa volta a causa del cybercrime. La norvegese **Norsk Hydro**, gigante mondiale attivo in tutta la filiera del metallo, ha rivelato di aver subito un «grave» attacco informatico che l'ha costretta a sospendere la produzione in diversi impianti e a farne funzionare altri in modalità manuale.

Gli hacker sono riusciti a violare i sistemi di sicurezza lunedì sera, presumibilmente negli Stati Uniti, per poi infettare quasi tutta la rete di

VIDEO



15 maggio 2019

Nelle sale operative di Mts, dove si forma lo spread

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Questions?

- Thank you for your attention!
- You can reach me at stefano.zanero@polimi.it
- Or just tweet @raistolo

